WTF has happened to our military might?

**xoggoth** · 22 September 2006, 15:31

The assumption that Afghanistan would be a doddle was quite bizarre in the first place given that the Russians failed with a much bigger force in a country that was on their doorstep.

**sasguru** · 22 September 2006, 15:36

Indeed. And British military might is a myth and has been for a long time. I don't mean the excellence of some individual units which is undoubted, but in terms of total strength.

**roger rabbit** · 22 September 2006, 15:39

Originally posted by sasguru

Indeed. And British military might is a myth and has been for a long time. I don't mean the excellence of some individual units which is undoubted, but in terms of total strength.

Our total military strength is undiminished. Just that now most of it is unchannelled on the terraces and in the clubs, not in the armed forces. What we need, as always, is a proper all out war.

**_V_** · 22 September 2006, 15:40

I think this article sums it up nicely.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article...350795,00.html

THE former aide-de-camp to the commander of the British taskforce in southern Afghanistan has described the campaign in Helmand province as “a textbook case of how to screw up a counter-insurgency”.
“Having a big old fight is pointless and just making things worse,” said Captain Leo Docherty, of the Scots Guards, who became so disillusioned that he quit the army last month.

“All those people whose homes have been destroyed and sons killed are going to turn against the British,” he said. “It’s a pretty clear equation — if people are losing homes and poppy fields, they will go and fight. I certainly would.

“We’ve been grotesquely clumsy — we’ve said we’ll be different to the Americans who were bombing and strafing villages, then behaved exactly like them.”

Docherty’s criticisms, the first from an officer who has served in Helmand, came during the worst week so far for British troops in Afghanistan, with the loss of 18 men.

They reflected growing concern that forces have been left exposed in small northern outposts of Helmand such as Sangin, Musa Qala and Nawzad. Pinned down by daily Taliban attacks, many have run short of food and water and have been forced to rely on air support and artillery.

“We’ve deviated spectacularly from the original plan,” said Docherty, who was aide-de-camp to Colonel Charlie Knaggs, the commander in Helmand.

“The plan was to secure the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, initiate development projects and enable governance . . . During this time, the insecure northern part of Helmand would be contained: troops would not be ‘sucked in’ to a problem unsolvable by military means alone.”

According to Docherty, the planning “fell by the wayside” because of pressure from the governor of Helmand, who feared the Taliban were toppling his district chiefs in northern towns.

Docherty traces the start of the problems to the British capture of Sangin on May 25, in which he took part. He says troops were sent to seize this notorious centre of Taliban and narcotics activity without night-vision goggles and with so few vehicles they had to borrow a pick-up truck.

More damningly, once they had established a base in the town, the mission failed to capitalise on their presence. Sangin has no paved roads, running water or electricity, but because of a lack of support his men were unable to carry out any development, throwing away any opportunity to win over townspeople.

“The military is just one side of the triangle,” he said. “Where were the Department for International Development and the Foreign Office? “The window was briefly open for our message to be spread, for the civilian population to be informed of our intent and realise that we weren’t there simply to destroy the poppy fields and their livelihoods. I felt at this stage that the Taliban were sitting back and observing us, deciding in their own time how to most effectively hit us.”

Eventually the Taliban attacked on June 11, when Captain Jim Philippson became the first British soldier to be killed in Helmand. British troops have since been holed up in their compound with attacks coming at least once a day. Seven British soldiers have died in the Sangin area.

“Now the ground has been lost and all we’re doing in places like Sangin is surviving,” said Docherty. “It’s completely barking mad.

“We’re now scattered in a shallow meaningless way across northern towns where the only way for the troops to survive is to increase the level of violence so more people get killed. It’s pretty shocking and not something I want to be part of.”

**sasguru** · 22 September 2006, 15:49

Originally posted by _V_

I think this article sums it up nicely.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article...350795,00.html

THE former aide-de-camp to the commander of the British taskforce in southern Afghanistan has described the campaign in Helmand province as “a textbook case of how to screw up a counter-insurgency”.
“Having a big old fight is pointless and just making things worse,” said Captain Leo Docherty, of the Scots Guards, who became so disillusioned that he quit the army last month.

“All those people whose homes have been destroyed and sons killed are going to turn against the British,” he said. “It’s a pretty clear equation — if people are losing homes and poppy fields, they will go and fight. I certainly would.

“We’ve been grotesquely clumsy — we’ve said we’ll be different to the Americans who were bombing and strafing villages, then behaved exactly like them.”

Docherty’s criticisms, the first from an officer who has served in Helmand, came during the worst week so far for British troops in Afghanistan, with the loss of 18 men.

They reflected growing concern that forces have been left exposed in small northern outposts of Helmand such as Sangin, Musa Qala and Nawzad. Pinned down by daily Taliban attacks, many have run short of food and water and have been forced to rely on air support and artillery.

“We’ve deviated spectacularly from the original plan,” said Docherty, who was aide-de-camp to Colonel Charlie Knaggs, the commander in Helmand.

“The plan was to secure the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, initiate development projects and enable governance . . . During this time, the insecure northern part of Helmand would be contained: troops would not be ‘sucked in’ to a problem unsolvable by military means alone.”

According to Docherty, the planning “fell by the wayside” because of pressure from the governor of Helmand, who feared the Taliban were toppling his district chiefs in northern towns.

Docherty traces the start of the problems to the British capture of Sangin on May 25, in which he took part. He says troops were sent to seize this notorious centre of Taliban and narcotics activity without night-vision goggles and with so few vehicles they had to borrow a pick-up truck.

More damningly, once they had established a base in the town, the mission failed to capitalise on their presence. Sangin has no paved roads, running water or electricity, but because of a lack of support his men were unable to carry out any development, throwing away any opportunity to win over townspeople.

“The military is just one side of the triangle,” he said. “Where were the Department for International Development and the Foreign Office? “The window was briefly open for our message to be spread, for the civilian population to be informed of our intent and realise that we weren’t there simply to destroy the poppy fields and their livelihoods. I felt at this stage that the Taliban were sitting back and observing us, deciding in their own time how to most effectively hit us.”

Eventually the Taliban attacked on June 11, when Captain Jim Philippson became the first British soldier to be killed in Helmand. British troops have since been holed up in their compound with attacks coming at least once a day. Seven British soldiers have died in the Sangin area.

“Now the ground has been lost and all we’re doing in places like Sangin is surviving,” said Docherty. “It’s completely barking mad.

“We’re now scattered in a shallow meaningless way across northern towns where the only way for the troops to survive is to increase the level of violence so more people get killed. It’s pretty shocking and not something I want to be part of.”

If all that is true, it would be interesting to know whose decision it was i.e. is it a political or military failure?

**bogeyman** · 22 September 2006, 16:13

Originally posted by roger rabbit

Our total military strength is undiminished. Just that now most of it is unchannelled on the terraces and in the clubs, not in the armed forces. What we need, as always, is a proper all out war.

I think there's a disturbing truth in there somewhere.

The youth of the British nations (English, Welsh, Scots, Irish et al) have always been a failry tribal and warlike bunch.

In days gone by, the Empire and the armed forces gave them a legitimate outlet for their agression, some sense of purpose, and a way to direct their agression. Arguably they made better men out of them too.

I fear that if we keep on pandering to British Islamists (one law for them, another for everyone else) then things could get very nasty indeed.

The Islamists think they hold all the cards (in the sense of 'I'll kill you if you offend me'), but I think there is a simmering kettle of British indignance at all of this.

I'm already suprised that most of the white, racist hotheads (NF, BNP etc.) have been so conspicuously silent. Perhaps they're hoping that the mainstream of the British people will finally awake from their media-induced slumber and realise their country has been stolen from them.

**DimPrawn** · 22 September 2006, 16:16

The more the BNP and like rant about "them bloody foreigners" the less likely the average British person is going to support them.

Let people judge the country for themselves and take the appropriate action at election time.

**bogeyman** · 22 September 2006, 16:22

Originally posted by DimPrawn

The more the BNP and like rant about "them bloody foreigners" the less likely the average British person is going to support them.

Let people judge the country for themselves and take the appropriate action at election time.

Correct in one sense:-

the British don't like fanatics and extreme politics.

Wrong in the main sense: -

the British don't like to be fecked-over by their government. It may take a while, but when the tulip hits the fan, it's going to be bloody ugly.

**Troll** · 22 September 2006, 16:26

Definition (old) of the British character

Slow to anger but fearsome once roused

WTF has happened to our military might?