This really spells it out the errors of brexit. Norway has money, we have debt. Lots of it. We could never afford to pay the trade tariffs, yet the exit camp argues we could be like Norway. 
We pay, but have no say: that’s the reality of Norway’s relationship with the EU | Espen Barth Eide | Opinion | The Guardian
We pay, but have no say: that’s the reality of Norway’s relationship with the EU | Espen Barth Eide | Opinion | The Guardian
We pay, but have no say: that’s the reality of Norway’s relationship with the EU | Espen Barth Eide
Norwegian town of Ålesund
As a former foreign minister of Norway, I am following Britain’s debate about its future relationship with the European Union with great interest. I have been struck by how a group of politicians hold my own country, Norway, aloft as a model to which to aspire. However, the way the Norwegian relationship with the EU is portrayed does not necessarily correspond to reality as I have experienced it.
Norway’s current arrangement is the outcome of two popular referendums, the first in 1972 and the second in 1994, which both ended in marginal victories for the no side.
It also has its roots in the process that began as the cold war was coming to an end in the late 1980s, when the then members of the European Free Trade Area (Efta) – Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Iceland and Norway –entered into negotiations with what was then the European Community to form the European Economic Area (EEA), extending the single market to Efta.
The process succeeded and the EEA was declared in 1992. While still negotiating, however, several Efta states chose to seek full membership of the European Union itself. Austria, Finland and Sweden all joined the EU in 1995, while Norway voted to stay out. Switzerland chose not to join the EEA, whereas Liechtenstein joined a few years later.
Since then, the EEA has become Norway’s national compromise on Europe.
As an EEA member, we do not participate in decision-making in Brussels, but we loyally abide by Brussels’ decisions. We have incorporated approximately three-quarters of all EU legislative acts into Norwegian legislation – and counting. We have legally secured access to the single market, and we practise the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Norway is more closely integrated into many aspects of the EU than even some of the EU’s members. Our subscription to freedom of movement and our membership of the Schengen area means that Norway has even higher per capita immigration than Britain.
Those campaigning for Britain to leave the EU and chose the Norwegian way can hence correctly claim that a country can retain access to the single market from outside the EU. What is normally not said, however, is that this also means retaining all the EU’s product standards, financial regulations, employment regulations, and substantial contributions to the EU budget. A Britain choosing this track would, in other words, keep paying, it would be “run by Brussels”, and it would remain committed to the four freedoms, including free movement.
Without full European Union membership, however, it would have given up on having a say over EU policies: like Norway, it would have no vote and no presence when crucial decisions that affect the daily lives of its citizens are made.
British voters might also hear about the virtues of the “Swiss model”. It so happens that I currently live in Switzerland. My new alpine homeland is in most respects in a similar position to Norway, but instead of the EEA, it has chosen an array of bilateral agreements with the EU on most aspects of integration.
Compared to the EEA arrangement it can be seen as an even more cumbersome way of integrating into a EU-led market. Where the EEA is dynamic – which means it trails the developments of EU policy in all relevant areas – the Swiss arrangements are static. Crucially, too, they don’t cover services, which are so central to Britain’s economy.
The reality is that every single western European country has chosen to take part in the European integration process in some shape or form. Not a single one has felt comfortable with just a classical free trade agreement. Modern economies are about so much more than trade in goods. Rather than a question of yes or no to Europe, it has become a matter of degree. Norway and Switzerland, heavily integrated as we both are in the EU, have simply chosen between the two currently existing options for staying in the outer circle.
The choice between staying in or leaving the European Union is of course for the British people to decide. But such an important debate should be based on realities. And in European politics, as in the UK, it is still true that you can’t have your cake and eat it too.
For us, a small, wealthy country on Europe’s periphery, to opt for the EEA solution has been a functioning national compromise after twice failing to secure support for full membership. For the UK, a major country and a long-standing, influential member of the EU, voluntarily to choose to move out of the core and into the outer circle, in order to join those influenced by but not influencing Brussels, would in my view be an entirely different matter.
Norwegian town of Ålesund
As a former foreign minister of Norway, I am following Britain’s debate about its future relationship with the European Union with great interest. I have been struck by how a group of politicians hold my own country, Norway, aloft as a model to which to aspire. However, the way the Norwegian relationship with the EU is portrayed does not necessarily correspond to reality as I have experienced it.
Norway’s current arrangement is the outcome of two popular referendums, the first in 1972 and the second in 1994, which both ended in marginal victories for the no side.
It also has its roots in the process that began as the cold war was coming to an end in the late 1980s, when the then members of the European Free Trade Area (Efta) – Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Iceland and Norway –entered into negotiations with what was then the European Community to form the European Economic Area (EEA), extending the single market to Efta.
The process succeeded and the EEA was declared in 1992. While still negotiating, however, several Efta states chose to seek full membership of the European Union itself. Austria, Finland and Sweden all joined the EU in 1995, while Norway voted to stay out. Switzerland chose not to join the EEA, whereas Liechtenstein joined a few years later.
Since then, the EEA has become Norway’s national compromise on Europe.
As an EEA member, we do not participate in decision-making in Brussels, but we loyally abide by Brussels’ decisions. We have incorporated approximately three-quarters of all EU legislative acts into Norwegian legislation – and counting. We have legally secured access to the single market, and we practise the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Norway is more closely integrated into many aspects of the EU than even some of the EU’s members. Our subscription to freedom of movement and our membership of the Schengen area means that Norway has even higher per capita immigration than Britain.
Those campaigning for Britain to leave the EU and chose the Norwegian way can hence correctly claim that a country can retain access to the single market from outside the EU. What is normally not said, however, is that this also means retaining all the EU’s product standards, financial regulations, employment regulations, and substantial contributions to the EU budget. A Britain choosing this track would, in other words, keep paying, it would be “run by Brussels”, and it would remain committed to the four freedoms, including free movement.
Without full European Union membership, however, it would have given up on having a say over EU policies: like Norway, it would have no vote and no presence when crucial decisions that affect the daily lives of its citizens are made.
British voters might also hear about the virtues of the “Swiss model”. It so happens that I currently live in Switzerland. My new alpine homeland is in most respects in a similar position to Norway, but instead of the EEA, it has chosen an array of bilateral agreements with the EU on most aspects of integration.
Compared to the EEA arrangement it can be seen as an even more cumbersome way of integrating into a EU-led market. Where the EEA is dynamic – which means it trails the developments of EU policy in all relevant areas – the Swiss arrangements are static. Crucially, too, they don’t cover services, which are so central to Britain’s economy.
The reality is that every single western European country has chosen to take part in the European integration process in some shape or form. Not a single one has felt comfortable with just a classical free trade agreement. Modern economies are about so much more than trade in goods. Rather than a question of yes or no to Europe, it has become a matter of degree. Norway and Switzerland, heavily integrated as we both are in the EU, have simply chosen between the two currently existing options for staying in the outer circle.
The choice between staying in or leaving the European Union is of course for the British people to decide. But such an important debate should be based on realities. And in European politics, as in the UK, it is still true that you can’t have your cake and eat it too.
For us, a small, wealthy country on Europe’s periphery, to opt for the EEA solution has been a functioning national compromise after twice failing to secure support for full membership. For the UK, a major country and a long-standing, influential member of the EU, voluntarily to choose to move out of the core and into the outer circle, in order to join those influenced by but not influencing Brussels, would in my view be an entirely different matter.
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